European Military Presence in the Sahel: Searching for Purpose, European Data Journalism Network

On January French President announced a new Coalition for the Sahel, to tackle with the security and development challenges in the region. But public debate in some countries about why so many organisations and countries are engaging in the region and what they hope to achieve has been lacking.

On January 13th in Pau, French President Emmanuel Macron announced a new Coalition for the Sahel, which will rest on 4 pillars of action: counterterrorism, military capacity-building, redeployment of state authority and development. Macron believes that there is a need for a stronger coalition in order to tackle the many challenges in the region. This is due to two factors: a change in the security dimension since the first French intervention in Mali in 2013, as now the number of armed groups has increased and such groups have spread across the region. Secondly, local support for the French mission Barkhane is rapidly decreasing, pushing Paris to search for broader participation from EU member states. The United States in turn, appear to be reluctant to act more forcefully, as Chief of Staff Mark Milley declared in Brussels after the summit.

Pau was chosen as the location for the Summit because seven of the thirteen French soldiers killed in Mali in a helicopter accident on November 25th last year were based there. This choice is emblematic of Macron’s view of the situation: French lives are being sacrificed to protect the citizens of the Sahel, as he declared at the news conference. The helicopters were supporting a ground operation fighting insurgents near the borders of Burkina Faso and Niger. In light of this shocking incident it is more important than ever that France – and other countries engaged in the Sahel – assess the effectiveness of their strategy in the region to avoid suffering other losses in vain.

International engagement

The accident occurred while the helicopters were reinforcing ground troops pursuing insurgents in the Liptako region, near the borders of Burkina Faso and Niger. French forces first intervened in early 2013 at the request of the Malian government when insurgent groups gained control over the northern part of Mali. In 2014, France changed the nature of their operations with the aim of working with local and regional allies to prevent these groups from regaining control.

However, in the past few years, instability has continued and even increased. Since January 2019, more than 1,500 civilians have been killed in Burkina Faso and Mali, and more than one million people have been internally displaced across the Sahel – more than twice the number of persons displaced in 2018.

In response, the French government has continued calls for help from regional and international actors. The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was also established in 2013 to support political processes in the country and carry out a number of security-related tasks. In addition, aside from the above-mentioned Opération Barkhane, France has also recently announced its new international special operations task force Takuba, which should be operational as of this year. Another French-led initiative to counter instability in the region has been the creation of the G5 Joint Force, which aims to train and deploy up to 5,000 personnel from the five member states. The stated intention of the G5 Joint Force is to replace Opération Barkhane and EU CSDP missions with the G5 Sahel Joint Force, however there appears to be no timeline for when such an objective should be achieved.

The EU and its member have spent €8 billion on development assistance in the Sahel alone, along with billions more on security, capacity building, and other programmes between 2014 and 2020. A number of countries have also promised to significantly increase their presence in the region this year. For instance, the UK has committed to deploy 250 soldiers in 2020 to support MINUSMA, while Denmark has promised to send 10 troops to MINUSMA and another 70 to Opération Barkhane. Germany is training the police and the gendarmerie in Burkina Faso and has pledged 10 millions for equipment, and a similar amount for advising troops by the Ministry of Defence.

Current dynamics and challenges

However, despite years of training (and huge financial commitment) the capabilities of the Malian armed forces remain poor. As French officials acknowledge, local security forces remain “woefully under-equipped and under-financed for shouldering the anti-jihadist fight despite years of French engagement”. In contrast, some analysts indicate that the armed groups on the ground are becoming increasingly skilled and command structures increasingly fluid. Bruno Clément-Bollée told the BBC that: “The rise in strength of the jihadists is a reality we can no longer deny.” In fact, just as France announced the death last month of Ali Maychou (a Moroccan leader of the Group to Support Islam and Muslims (GSIM)), the country sustained a wave of insurgency strikes on army outposts and other targets. This is part of a broader pattern in which the number of violent events linked to militant Islamic group activity in the Sahel has been doubling every year since 2016.

In fact, far from stemming the violence – international engagement often appears to be exacerbating instability. In some areas, predatory states have further alienated the civilian population and pushed them more towards extremist groups. During interviews the Remote Warfare Programme undertook in Mali, soldiers said that “[i]njustice is actually a huge motivator among the people […] who end up joining [extremist] groups.” Similarly, an International Alert study on young Fulani people in the regions of Mopti (Mali), Sahel (Burkina Faso) and Tillabéri (Niger) found “real or perceived state abuse is the number one factor behind young people’s decision to join violent extremist groups.”

Added to this, the EU is currently training large numbers of local troops in basic soldiering without exerting much pressure on the government in Bamako to introduce structural reforms. This is despite the fact the Malian Armed Forces (and government) have been accused of ethnic bias. This is particularly true “when it comes to relying on ethnic self-defence forces operating in the central and northern regions of the country to provide security where they cannot (or will not) operate.” Accelerating the growth of an unrepresentative force in the context of on-going conflicts between different ethnicities, especially in Mali could be extremely detrimental to long-term security. This, coupled with the many security-oriented strategies currently unfolding in the region, indicates a lack of a coherent strategy for international forces.

Asking for an end state

Yet, despite these challenges, the public debate in some countries about why so many organisations and countries are engaging in the region and what they hope to achieve has been lacking. France’s unwillingness to discuss its strategy for the Sahel has led a number of critics to claim that it lacks one and risks becoming bogged down in a fight it cannot win without significant new investments in soldiers and material. Some have even referred to Mali as “France’s Afghanistan” because they “no longer know what to do.” However, despite growing concern over its approach, there seems to be a continued unwillingness to engage with French and international public and civil society over its aims, strategy and the dangers of the current approach.

The same appears true of the UK. Many British soldiers, officials and commentators worried that the UK’s “Pivot to the Sahel” lacked sufficient consideration and was based more on political signalling, primarily for the benefit of France, than a belief that the UK could positively contribute to peace and stability in the region. However, it has been unwilling to engage in a debate over what its strategy is. For instance, the government was criticised by the Foreign Affairs committee for calling its approach to Africa a ‘Strategy’, instead the committee said it amounted to “effectively a bunch of bullet points” which made it much more difficult to criticise or even engage with effectively. This approach is not true of all countries providing troops to the region.

Unlike France and the UK, the Danish government has been willing to engage and debate its strategy for the Sahel. For instance, some politicians have raised serious challenges, particularly in regards to its support to Opération Barkhane, arguing that the contribution would be based on a desire to please the US, UK, and France, rather than a careful consideration of the strategic value of the contribution. Some also worried that it would contribute to an international effort which is not taking sufficient account of the needs of local and regional partners. The Danish parliament still voted to support both the UN mission and Opération Barkhane, however its government was forced to publicly address potential dangers before its deployment and explain how they would be mitigated against.

The November accident reveals one of these dangers, and as instability continues in the Sahel it is likely more soldiers and civilians will pay the price for international counterterrorism objectives. Denmark’s approach to engagement in Mali, then, may provide some important lessons for others. In particular, countries like France and – after its upcoming deployment – the UK need to be frank and honest about what their objectives are and how they intend to achieve them.


Facts and figures

European presence in Mali and Sahel

UK contributions to Mali and the Sahel more broadly
UK deployment in Mali: In July 2018, three Chinook helicopters supported by approximately 90 British troops arrived to support operation Barkhane. In 2020, the UK will deploy “a long-range reconnaissance task group of 250 personnel” to support the United Nations multidimensional integrated stabilisation mission in Mali (on top of £49.5 million already pledged to the mission as part of the UK’s regular contributions to UN peacekeeping missions).

– In March 2019, Harriett Baldwin, then Minister for Africa, said “[t]otal UK spending on development in Nigeria, bringing together all the different Departments…is £319 million.”

– The UK has trained over 30 000 Nigerian forces by October 2019

– In 2016, the UK government raised the number of British training teams working with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Somali National Army (SNA) from 12 to 30 accompanied by a pledge for an additional £21 million of funding.

– Up to 70 British troops have also been deployed under United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia

– The British Peace support team Africa (based near nairobi) trains regional troops participating in peacekeeping missions. for instance, it has trained – among others – over 700 Zambian and 6000 Ugandan peacekeepers for Un and African Union (AU) deployments to the central African republic and somalia.36 in 2017, it widened its geographic mandate from east Africa to cover the whole continent.

– Italy will soon deploy approximately 470 troops and 130 vehicles and two airplanes to Niger in an effort to curb illegal migration

The EU and UN
– The EU and its member states are projected to spend €8 billion on development assistance in the Sahel alone, along with billions more on security, capacity building, and other programmes between 2014 and 2020. The EU supports a number of security initiatives: it has already provided €100 million to establish the African led G5 Sahel Joint Force which aims to improve security 3 csdp missions. The Council extended the mandate of the EU mission EUCAP Sahel Mali until January 2021 and allocated it a budget of almost EUR67 million.

– Mali is the most dangerous country in the world for UN peacekeepers: By August 2019, 123 peacekeepers had died and 358 have been severely wounded in the ongoing counter-insurgency operations.

Civilian casualties in the Sahel
– Between January and mid-November 2019, 1500 civilians have been killed in Burkina Faso

– In the same period, more than 1.000.000 have been internally displaced in Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Mauritania and Chad. This is more than twice the number displaced in 2018.

The number of reported violent events linked to militant Islamic group activity in the Sahel has also been doubling every year since 2016 (from 90 in 2016 to 194 in 2017 to 465 in 2018). Reported fatalities linked to militant Islamist groups have similarly doubled in recent years (from 218 in 2016 to 529 in 2017 to 1,110 in 2018) – as well as targeting the civilian population, these groups directly target foreign troops and the UN mission in the country.

Armed Drones in Europe

2019 Open Society Foundations

See the full report at the link

The use of armed drones in the European Union has become a topic rife with controversy and misinformation. This report gives a comprehensive and in-depth overview of the approach to, and use of, armed drones in five European countries: Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, France, and the United Kingdom. Further, the report is intended to start a wider debate about armed drones in Europe and to serve as a guide on this topic for the European Parliament.

How the EU can Improve its Role in the Sahel

2019 European Data Journalism Network and VoxEurop

The European Union supports a number of security initiatives in the region, where rampant Islamist militants threaten stability and the population. But it could also play a true peace broking role – if it had a proper strategy.

“The glass is half full, it’s complex and we have a lot to do, but I’m convinced we are on the right track.” French Defence Minister Florence Parly at the Munich Security conference on February 16th 2019, said that French presence in the G5 Sahel countries (Mauritania, Mali, Chad, Niger and Burkina Faso) will improve the security situation in the region.

More than six years after French troops intervened in Mali to stop Islamist militants advancing on the capital Bamako through Opération Serval first and Opération Barkhane later, the northern region of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, have been suffering some of the deadliest attacks to record in the past year.

On April 3rd 2019, Islamic State Amaq Agency released its first video footage of an alleged attack against French forces in Mali on the border with Niger. At the Munich Security Conference Foreign Minister of Burkina Faso Mamadou Alpha Barry also lamented increasing instability in the region, stating that the money promised to the G5 Sahel force is yet to be disbursed. France, due to its colonial ties to the region, has kept about 4,500 troops and pushed for the creation of a force made up of soldiers from the G5 group to combat jihadist extremism. In addition to the lack of resources, the G5 Force impact has been reduced due to poor coordination amongst the five African countries.

In September 2017, Italy and Niger have also signed an agreement to develop bilateral cooperation on security matters: it was believed that the agreement would only deal with migrant influxes, but it appears Italian defence industry Leonardo will also benefit from the agreement, as revealed by a Freedom of Information Act in February 2019. This type of agreement does not need to be ratified and is not subject to Parliamentary scrutiny, easing government action on security operations in the Sahel. The Italian mission will be based in Niamey and had initially been blocked by France, in a biff with Rome over influence in the region.

Another aligned mission is the UN peacekeeping mission MINUSMA (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali), made up of about 10.000 troops and 2.000 police officers. Finally, Germany is also present with its Heron surveillance drones. As for US presence, Niger Air Base 201 in Agadez, a future hub for armed drones and other aircraft, won’t be completed until mid-2019. Air Base 201, a compound of three large hangars in the middle of the desert, twice the size of Agadez itself, will eventually house the U.S. armed drone mission in Niger that currently operates out of Niamey. A report by the Guardian in 2018 states that foreign military presence has had negative impacts on freedom of speech and many opposition leaders have lamented the lack of Parliamentary oversight whenever foreign presence is authorised.

The evolution of the conflicts in the region is pointing towards more responsibilities to remote warfare tactics, and less to ground troops. The paradox is evident: power players in the region are interventionist still, but unwilling to bear the human cost. Very recent research conducted by the Oxford Research Group in Mali (and Kenya) in September 2018 adds to this complexity by explaining how the political vacuum in capitals leads to a disarrayed coordination of troops on the ground: in Mali “there were a few men scattered across the multiple international military initiatives in the country run by the EU, the UN and the French without a clear sense of how these activities – in aggregate – might lead to a sustainable improvement in the capacity of their Malian partners”. In addition HQ too often considers personnel on the ground as less relevant in the decision making process, as the political authority is within capitals, which leads to a strategic long-term gap. Some short-term tactics (such as preferring to train soldiers who belong to a specific ethnic group) may be quick and effective in the short term, but lead to further complications in the long term in a country marred by ethnic conflict.

The European Union is the ideal peace broker in the region, not least because of how the region is perceived by some member states. Andrew Lebovich argues that it is in the Sahel that some EU members believe they must fight a key battle for the future of the European project, viewing the stabilisation of the region – particularly through initiatives to hamper migration and suppress terrorist threats – as key to combating populist nationalism in their respective countries.

The EU has been heightening its resolutions for providing security in the region in response to a succession of destabilising events, from the 2012 Tuareg rebellion in northern Mali and subsequent terrorist occupation of the area to the migration crisis that swept Europe from 2015 onwards (although European concern about the region had been increasing since 2008, if not earlier). European leaders are also extremely proud that they saw the region as central much before other powers did and started deploying personnel very early on.

The EU supports a number of security initiatives: it has already provided €100 million to establish the African led G5 Sahel Joint Force which aims to improve security in the region and fight terrorist and criminal groups. In July 2017, France, Germany and the European Union (soon joined by the World Bank, the African Development Bank, UNDP and Italy, Spain, the UK amongst others) launched the Sahel Alliance , an initiative aimed at addressing the volatile security environment in the region through development projects and sustainable peace. One of the guiding principles of the Alliance is domestic security, which focuses on cross-border threats such as terrorism, trafficking and organised crime.

The EU is itself a security player in the Sahel, with three Common Security and Defence Policy missions (EUCAP Sahel Niger, EUCAP Sahel Mali , EU training mission – EUTM in Mali). The Council extended the mandate of the EU mission EUCAP Sahel Mali until January 2021 and allocated it a budget of almost €67 million . In addition, the EU is planning to establish a fourth CSDP mission in the region in the coming years. It also provides more than €400 million in programmes to support stability and development in the region. One example: in Mali the EU launched in 2017 a stabilisation action in a small area, responsible for advising the Malian authorities in Mopti and Segou on governance-related issues, and supporting the planning and implementation by the Malian authorities of activities aimed at reinstating the civilian administration and basic services in the region. This team also intended to support an enhanced dialogue  between the Malian authorities and the local communities.

However, in their drive to respond to political pressure from member states, which may be different and differently articulated, EU interventions in the region sometimes fail to adapt to conditions on the ground, potentially contributing to instability in the long run. These interventions also risk creating overly convoluted and flimsy bureaucracies. The G5 Sahel force risks becoming another security architecture , which further risks exacerbating the situation in the region: the EU should rather focus on a civilian rather than military component, in order to build trust with the local population and gather much needed data. The EU must also contend with member states’ competing interests and overlapping missions and contributions, from French Barkhane to the recent Italian deployment – coupled with a growing US remote presence.

In terms of local perceptions the EU is better suited to be a presence on the ground compared to other foreign forces: Niger’s government has recognised EUCAP Sahel Niger’s value and gradually adapted to the mission, also increasing its participation. This shift in attitude could be seen following the onset of the European migration crisis, which showed local governments that European interest in the region was heavily dependent on the emergency and which prompted demands from authoritarian regimes in the region: elites in partner countries such as Niger show that they have learned how to use European demands to their own advantage.

As for European remote warfare in the region and much needed regulation changes in Brussels, the new European Defence Fund (coupled with the European Peace Facility) represents an occasion to have a positive impact in the region. One example of this could be the acquisition and use of armed drones: since the EU Defence Fund will not be a competence of member states, such as Italy and France who are already or will deploy armed drones in the region, but an EU prerogative, Brussels should focus on regulating how such missions are conducted by obtaining an EU Common Policy on armed drones . In this way the EU could have a say on how such weapon is deployed, in order not to fall for the US trap of endless remote warfare.

Moreover, the EU’s integrated strategy for the Sahel centres on the idea that security, development, and governance are strongly intertwined. EU strategy presents several positive, innovative ideas for securing troubled areas, where a military approach is not deemed to be sufficient to securing the region. The European Council allowed for the establishment of a regional coordination cell (RCC) based within EUCAP Sahel Mali. This cell includes a network of internal security and defence experts, deployed in Mali but also in EU delegations in other G5 Sahel countries. The RCC command and control structure will move from Bamako to Nouakchott and its network of CSDP experts will be enlarged.

The RCC will support, through strategic advice, the G5 Sahel structures and countries and the objective of the cell’s activities will be to strengthen the G5 Sahel regional and national capacities, in particular to support the operationalisation of the G5 Sahel joint force military and police components. EUCAP Sahel Mali and EUCAP Sahel Niger will be able to conduct targeted activities of strategic advice and training in other G5 Sahel countries. The European Council envisages that in the medium to long term, the coordination hub’s function will be transferred from Brussels to the structures of the G5 Sahel.

The coordination hub is a mechanism which has operated under the responsibility of the EU military staff since November 2017 and which provides an overview of the needs of the military G5 joint force together with the potential offers of military support from EU member states and from other donors. In other words, it is a forum which allows matching offers to needs.

However, in order to avoid all issues mentioned above, the EU should make sure that it establishes clear processes that would not only be beneficial to its mission, but which could also aid other foreign and regional presences. Its new focus on security and defence and its renewed interest in the Sahel are good incentives to take up responsibility for all foreign forces operating in the region. In order to avoid duplicating efforts, creating larger and uncooperative architectures and being perceived merely as a self-interested foreign force by the local population, the EU must ensure cooperation not just amongst its different missions in the region, but also amongst all other security actors. In addition it should offer a clear and large civilian component to its missions and make sure that governance and development represent a much wider part of its agenda, starting from nudging towards a security sector reform in the areas in which it operates.

The EU should also have in mind a clear time frame, and different and complementary objectives throughout all phases, with a particular attention to the initial and final moments. This would avoid mistakes such as the creation of other divisive community fractures, as is the case with UK forces, and lack of lessons learned due to not clearly established reporting mechanisms both internally and to Brussels.

Finally, the EU should have a positive communication role, not just amongst the different institutional and military actors in the region, but also with the local communities and civil society actors. The EU can do so in a much more effective way compared to other actors given its connections to member states’ missions, its lack of colonial and neo-colonial reputation and its resources.

In sum, the Sahel is experiencing a hardening of the security situation due to criminal and terrorist threats and both resources and personnel are pouring in from certain European Member States, the UN and the US. This, far from creating stability, risks further exacerbating present tensions and is negatively perceived by local communities. EU missions and EU funds could be beneficial in avoiding mistakes due to poor management and coordination amongst local and foreign forces. The EU should understand its leverage and use it to the advantage of the two key words born in the crest of the G5 security alliance: security and development.

Scroll to top